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INTRODUCTION
As the first state to prohibit slavery by constitution, and one of the
few states which, from its inception, extended the vote to male citizens
who did not own land, the State of Vermont has long been at the forefront
of this nation's march toward full equality for all of its citizens. In July
1997, three same-sex couples challenged Vermont to act as a leader yet
again, this time in affording full civil rights to the State's gay and lesbian
citizens. Stan Baker and Peter Harrigan, Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles, and
Holly Puterbaugh and Lois Farnham were denied marriage licenses by
their respective town clerks in the summer of 1997. They sued the State of
Vermont and the towns, arguing that the marriage statutes allowed them
to marry, and that if the law did purport to limit marriage to different
sex unions it would be unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed their
claims in December 1997, and the couples appealed to the Vermont Su-
preme Court. The court heard oral arguments on the case on November
18, 1998.
The Appellants' primary constitutional claim is based on the
"Common Benefits Clause" of the Vermont Constitution, which prohibits
the State from passing laws for the particular "emolument or advantage"
of a 'part only of [the] community. "1 The Vermont Supreme Court has
used an analytical framework similar to federal equal protection law in
applying the Common Benefits Clause, although in some cases that court
has scrutinized classifications more closely than might be required under
federal law.
In contrast to the State of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin,2 where the
State argued that its laws did not discriminate, the State of Vermont
1. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
2. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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articulated its rationales in support of the discriminatory marriage laws at
the outset of the Baker v. State litigation, affording the couples the first
real opportunity to flesh out in some depth not only the appropriate level
ofscrutiny, but also the State's lack of an adequate justification under any
standard. The couples' opening brief, published in the Michigan Journal
of Gender & Law, Volume 5, Issue 2, delves into the State's explanations
for its discriminatory laws in some depth, arguing that even absent height-
ened scrutiny, the State could notjustify its discriminatory marriage laws.
The opening brief also lays out three arguments for heightened scrutiny,
based on the State's gender discrimination, sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, and impingement on a fndamental right-the right to marry.
In their reply brief, the couples expand on their heightened scrutiny
arguments and focus on some of the key issues raised in the State's brief,
including the relationship between procreation and marriage, the impact
on law and society of recognizing the couples' marriages, and the role of
the courts in this highly charged debate.
Susan Murray and-Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool in
Middlebury, Vermont, and Mary Bonauto of Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders in Boston, Massachusetts, represented the three couples.
I. THIS Is A HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY CASE
Appellants Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles, Holly Puterbaugh and
Lois Farnham, and Stan Baker and Peter Harrigan have upheld their
end of the Social Compact. They abide by the laws; they live with in-
tegrity; they volunteer in their communities; they work hard at their
jobs; and, above all else, they value their commitments to their fami-
lies. All they seek for themselves and their families is the same security
and respect under Vermont's laws and constitution that their hetero-
sexual neighbors enjoy.
The disability the State has imposed on Appellants touches one
of the most personal and fundamental aspects of their lives, implicat-
ing their very dignity and identities, and the State has unabashedly
based its preference on invidious classifications-gender and sexual
orientation. Contrary to the State's suggestion, this is a heightened
scrutiny case.
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A. The Right to Many Is Fundamental to All Individuals
Appellants, Appellants' amici, the State, and the State's amici all
seem to agree on one thing: marriage and family are profoundly im-
portant associations and institutions in our society. What the State
and its amici ignore is that these institutions are profoundly important
to everyone, whether gay, lesbian, or heterosexual This case does not
present a conflict between gay and lesbian relationships, on the one
hand, and families, on the other; like their heterosexual counterparts,
gay and lesbian couples, with or without children, are families. Those
aspects of the institution of civil marriage that render it
"fundamental" for heterosexual couples-both in the legal sense and
in the vernacular-apply with equal force to same-sex couples.
No one denies that the right to marry has long been deemed fun-
damental in Vermont and throughout the United States.4 However,
the State focuses on the fundamental right to marry at the most spe-
cific level, concluding that because cases affirming the fundamental
right to marry have always involved different-sex couples, the right is
limited to such couples. If courts defined historical "fundamental
rights" at the level of specificity urged by the State, privacy would not
include rights to contraception, abortion, or interracial marriage. 5
3. The State is wrong to assert that this is not "a benefits case." State's Brief at 2. As set
forth in Appellants' Brief at 3-5 and the Brief Amicus Curiae of Parents and Friends
of Lesbians and Gays et al., civil marriage opens the door to hundreds of legal pro-
tections, supports, and obligations, the vast majority of which are simply out of reach
for Appellants because they cannot marry. Cumulatively, these laws provide a singu-
lar measure of security and recognition to families formed by married partners.
However, this is not just a benefits case. Through civil marriage, the State con-
fers a status, see State's Brief at 2, which plugs into a common social vocabulary and
carries powerful personal and cultural weight. Only the State can provide access to
that legal status. In discharging its gatekeeper role, the State must comply with its
own constitutional limitations.
4. For the reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief at 6-15, Vermont's existing marriage
laws authorize Appellants to marry, and Appellees' interpretation of those laws is
wrong. The State's references to the legislative debates surrounding Vermont's ERA
(which did not pass), a 1975 Attorney General Opinion, and legislative testimony
relating to a proposed amendment to the marriage laws (which was tabled by a single
committee of one branch of the legislature) do not undermine Appellants' statutory
claims. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 6-15. For a full discussion of these ar-
guments, not addressed in Appellants' Brief, see Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law
("Plaintiffs' Memorandum"), Printed Case ("PC") at 133-36. '
5. Moreover, the State evaluates Appellants' fundamental rights claim under the Com-
mon Benefits Clause with reference to federal "substantive due process"
[Vol. 6:1
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In determining the appropriate level of specificity with respect to
defining the fundamental right to marry, this Court should consider
the core values that animate courts' definitions of marriage and fam-
ily, and which elevate those institutions to the level of "fundamental
rights."
This Court has previously recognized that the organizing princi-
ple of family is care, support, and love.6
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals rejected "fictitious le-
gal distinctions or genetic history" in defining "family" for the
purposes of a rent control law, instead concluding that "two adult
lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by
an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence" com-
prised a family.
7
The United States Supreme Court has described in some detail
the core values that define and give significance to family in general,
and marriage in particular:
[We have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Na-
tion by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs;
they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers be-
tween the individual and the power of the State. Moreover,
jurisprudence, failing to recognize that "fundamental rights" may have different con-
tent in an equal protection-type analysis than a due process analysis. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988)(contrasting
history-bound nature of due process analysis with history-defying nature of equal
protection analysis).
6. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 375, 376 (1993)(noting that "the advancement of
reproductive technologies and society's recognition of alternative lifestyles.., have
produced families in which a biological, and therefore a legal, connection is no longer
the sole organizing principle," and pointing to provision of nutrition, schooling,
shelter, love, nurture, and a secure partnership between parents as among the inci-
dents of parenthood); see also MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 462
(1996)(rejecting suggestion that adopted child could be presumed a "second-class"
member of the family).
7. Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-89 (Ct. App. 1989)(concluding
that two gay males in a committed relationship constituted a family); see also In re
Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. App.
1991)(recognizing long term lesbian partners as "a family of affinity, which ought to
be accorded respect"); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, slip
op. at 4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998)(Appeiant's Appendix Tab 2)("[Tlhe
choice of a life partner is personal, intimate, and subject to the protection of the right
to privacy.").
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the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects
the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional
enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these re-
lationships from unwarranted state interference therefore
safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty.
The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations
.. . are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a
family-marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of
children, and cohabitation with one's relatives. Family rela-
tionships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects
of one's life.8
Moreover, that Court has recognized that such values are not
limited to families made up of a husband, wife, and children, rejecting
an invitation to "cut[] off any protection of family rights at the first
convenient, if arbitrary boundary-the boundary of the nuclear fam-
ily," and concluding that the United States Constitution prevents the
government from "standardizing its children-and its adults-by
forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."9
Perhaps the most critical of these "deep attachments and com-
mitments" is that between married partners. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the profound unitive significance of
marriage, explaining,
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
8. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984)(citations omit-
ted) (upholding state law compelling Jaycees to accept women over Jaycees' freedom
of association defense).
9. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502, 506 (1977)(striking down housing
ordinance prohibiting grandmother from sharing an apartment with two grandsons);
see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844
(1977) (acknowledging that "the importance of the familial relationship, to the indi-
viduals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in... [raising] chil-
dren").
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is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.'0
The Court's vision of companionate marriage embraces those couples
who procreate as well as those who do not.1
In short, marriage is a fundamental right because the profound
mutual love, respect, commitment, and intimacy that define that rela-
tionship are essential for human dignity and happiness, 2 and are
valuable to society as a whole. 3
The State expresses reverence for the institution of marriage, but
then trivializes Appellants' aspirations to participate in that institu-
tion, comparing families formed by same-sex couples to two male
college roommates seeking housing or other benefits. 4 Likewise, the
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
11. See infra Section IIIA; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)("The free-
dom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."). The landmark case of Loving v. Vir-
ginia firmly established a federal constitutional fundamental right to marry the
partner of one's choice. 388 U.S. at 12. Subsequent United States Supreme Court
decisions have confirmed that this fundamental right to marry has implications far
beyond the specific facts of Loving. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
12. The Vermont Constitution recognizes the fundamental importance of every person's
natural, inherent, and unalienable right to, among other things, "pursu[e] and ob-
tainfG happiness and safety." VT. CONSr. ch. I, art. 1. The inherent, inalienable right
to marry supports Appellants' daims independent of the Common Benefits Clause.
See Appellants' Brief, supranote 3, at 66, Plaintiffs' Memorandum, PC, supra note 4,
at 209-17, and BriefAmicus Curiae of Vermont Human Rights Commission.
13. Even the legal scholars relied upon by the State and its amici recognize that the core
values and functions of marriage are to promote individual dignity and happiness, as
well as more cohesive communities, by providing dear legal rules and support for
loving, respectful, and committed relationships between married partners. See, e.g.,
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status ofMarriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy, 81
MICH. L. Rav. 463, 486 (1983)("The willingness to marry permits important legal
and personal assumptions to arise about one's intentions. Marriage, like adoption,
carries with it a commitment toward permanerice that places it in a different category
of relational interests than if it were temporary."); Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling
Function in Family Law, 20 HoFsTRA L. Ray. 495, 506 (1992)("The institution of
marriage... attempts to induce in spouses a sense of an obligation to treat each other
well-to love and honor each other.").
14. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 6; see also BriefAmicus Curiae of Professors of Law
and Jurisprudence at 17 [hereinafter "State's Scholars' Brief'] (comparing family
formed by same-sex couple to a men's or women's doubles team in tennis).
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State acknowledges that limitations on the right to marry are subject
to heightened scrutiny, except when same sex couples are involved.
What the State fails to recognize is that Appellants' relationships serve
all the same core values as those of their heterosexual neighbors, pro-
viding them individual fulfillment, and enabling them to participate
in and contribute to the larger community as families. Like Mildred
and Richard Loving, and Estelle Griswold, Appellants stand before
this Court seeking protection for their most intimate of relation-
ships-fundamental to their very happiness and dignity.
B. The State's Gender Classification Is Impermissible atAll Levels, 5
The State attempts to diminish the common ground between
same-sex partners and different-sex partners by seizing on the one
characteristic that could plausibly distinguish same-sex and different
sex relationships: the genders of the parties involved. The State claims
that the very essence of marriage is not simply love, respect, trust,
mutual commitment and intimacy. Rather, the State and amici argue
that what elevates marriage to the status of a basic fundamental right,
to the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples, is the gender difference
between the married partners. This claim brazenly defies the constitu-
tional prohibition of gender classifications.
1. The State, Not Divine Providence, Defines Civil Marriage
The State appears to be of two sharply-divided minds with re-
spect to its own role in defining civil marriage. In insisting that the
legislature is empowered to define marriage however it wants, the
State asserts that "marriage is a creature of legislation and ... within
constitutional bounds, the Legislature retains control over its regula-
tion." 16 Yet in an effort to deny the State's complicity in the gender
classifications it imposes, the State argues, "Vermont's marriage laws
do not discriminate on the basis of gender. Rather, they simply accept
15. For the reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief, the State's dassifications also impermis-
sibly discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. See Appellants' Brief, supra note
3, at 60-64; Brief Amicus Curiae of Vermont Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights
et al.; see also Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As
A Suspect Classification, 98 HAsv. L. Rnv. 1285 (1985).
16. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 67.
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the premise that a marriage is a unique institution in society that is
comprised of one member from each sex. Its composition was deter-
mined before statutes were ever enacted."7 In relying on such a
"definitional preclusion" argument,' 8 the State is invoking some un-
named higher authority which imposes a gender requirement on
marriage, and from whose definition of marriage the legislature is
powerless to stray. As one leading commentator has observed:
When the Hallahan court [which upheld Kentucky's differ-
ent gender requirement in marriage in 1973] asserted that
appellants could not marry because they were unable to meet
the definitional requirements, the court implied that the
legislature was not itself responsible for the legal definition
of marriage, as if the legislature were subject to the com-
mands of some Higher Power....
Legislatures are not prevented from recognizing same-sex
marriages because of some externally imposed definition of
the term, and courts must stop implying that legislative
bodies are not responsible for the definitions they create.19
In short, the State is either offering a hopelessly circular argu-
ment, or it is improperly invoking some theological or natural law
definition of marriage.20 The State should be wary of relying on
17. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 79 (emphasis added).
18. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 79-8 1.
19. Mark A. Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great Slumbering Baehr.
On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FoaRDaAm
L. REv. 921, 923-24, 926 (1995).
20. Appellants cannot emphasize enough that religious marriage exists apart from the
civil law. Civil law has absolutely no role in establishing what constitutes marriage for
any faith, and vice versa. Thus, the State can recognize as valid the second marriage of
a divorced Catholic even when the Catholic Church, as a matter of its own doctrine,
would not. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-07, 109 (1968)(striking
down state law prohibiting teaching of evolution when it was not justified by any
secular purpose but only by a desire to support religious views of some of its citizens).
Convoluting the institutions of civil and religious marriage, the scholars relied
upon by the State and its amid have identified the source of the "Higher Authority"
which they believe defines marriage for the State. See, e.g., Lynn Marie Kohm, Liberty
and Marriage Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 B.Y.U. J. PUBLIC LAw 253,
266 & n.83 (1998)(State's Appendix # 10)("Marriage is above and beyond the Bill of
Rights .... Marriage ... was originally designed by a Supreme Being before codifi-
cation of the law of marriage."); Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the
1999]
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perceived theological imperative or natural law mandate in restricting
the opportunities of men and women on the basis of sex.
21
Indeed, the State's invocation of a higher authority to justify dis-
criminatory classifications in the marriage laws is nothing new.22
In short, the State cannot simply deny the sex discrimination
built into its marriage statutes by asserting that the discrimination
Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor A "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHics & PUB. PoL'y 587, 592 (1996)("I write as an academic lawyer and as a
Christian. My views are informed and animated by what I consider to be the best
public policy arguments, as well as by my belief in the created order as revealed in the
Old and New Testaments. To the extent that my "secular" views and "religious"
views can be distinguished, they each affirm the heterosexual ideal for marriage. In-
deed, religious reasoning and secular reasoning should always reach identical conclusions
.. " (emphasis added))(other works by Duncan cited in State's Brief, supra note 3,
at 49, 50, 54, 82); Teresa Stanton Collett, Marriage, Family and the Positive Law, 10
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. PoL'Y 467, 476 n.36 (1996)(citing Pope John Paul
II and a book on Jewish religious thought, which she quotes for the proposition that
"[s]ince woman was created from man's rib (Gen. 2:21-24), the unification of their
bodies in marriage is a result of a natural tendency to make complete that which was
originally sundered apart")(Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Peter Brady et al. [hereinafter
"Brady Brief"]) at 26; David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike
and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. Tax. L. Rav. 1, 44-55 (1997)(author of Brady
Brief, and cited therein)(citing "Neo-Calvinism," "Classical Thomism," and "New
Natural Law," and discussing other religious bases for a model of marriage based on
"sexual complementarity").
Many of the amici who support the State are similarly up-front about the theo-
logical foundation of their arguments. See Statement on Same Sex Marriage by Roman
Catholic Church, Brief Amicus Curiae of The Roman Catholic Diocese et al.
[hereinafter "Roman Catholic Brief"] at Appendix I ("[Marriage] was established by
God with its own proper laws... [and] the natural institution of marriage has been
blessed and elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament."); Statement ofInterest of
Burlington Vermont Stake of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Roman
Catholic Brief at Appendix II ("The Church teaches that marriage between man and
woman is ordained of God ... "); statements of various Vermont community
churches, Brief Amicus Curiae of Christian Legal Society et al. [hereinafter "Christian
Legal Society Brief"] at 2a-9a (asserting that marriage is limited to heterosexual un-
ions by virtue of the Bible, God, or the "Holy Scripture").
21. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872)(Bradley, J., concur-
ring)("Mhe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman .... The paramount des-
tiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted
to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."
(emphasis added)) (upholding exclusion of women from the practice of law).
22. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967)("Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents....
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix." (quoting trial court decision upholding interracial marriage ban)).
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flows inexorably from some transcendent definition of marriage. If, as
the State has argued in other contexts, the Vermont legislature has
chosen to incorporate gender-based limitations in its "entrance re-
quirements" for marriage, then those gender-based limitations must
survive heightened constitutional scrutiny.
2. Constitutional Rights Are Personal, Not Group-Based
The State contends that its gender-based classification is not dis-
criminatory because it restricts the marital choices of men and women
even-handedly.'s This argument shifts the inquiry from whether the
marriage laws improperly limit an individual's marital choice on the
basis of a gender-based classification to whether those laws limit (on
the basis of gender) the choices of men as a group to the same extent
as they limit the choices of women as a group.
In 1948, the California Supreme Court rejected such an "equal
application" theory, becoming the first state supreme court to strike
down race-based marriage laws, almost 20 years before the United
States Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia:
The decisive question ... is not whether different races, each
considered as a group, are equally treated. The right to
marry is the right of individuals, not of racial groups. The
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
does not refer to rights of [particular races], but to the rights
of individuals.... Since the essence of the right to marry is
freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice,
a segregation statute for marriage necessarily impairs the
right to marry.24
23. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 81.
24. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 20-21 (Cal. 1948). Significantly, the State does not
even cite the Perez decision, let alone attempt to distinguish it from the case at bar,
even though the plaintiffs in that case invoked constitutional equality protections to
overturn a longstanding and widely embraced, but nonetheless discriminatory,
"definition" of marriage. See also Loving, 388 U.S. at 9 ("In the case at bar.., we
deal with statutes containing racial dassifications, and the fact of equal application
does not immunize the statute from the veiy heavy burden of justification which the
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according
to race.").
1999]
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The State attempts to avoid the force of the miscegenation anal-
ogy by noting that the Virginia law in Loving did not restrict the
choices of Black and White persons equally; rather, the law allowed a
Black person to marry any non-White, but allowed a White person to
marry only another White person.25 Such a distinction, in and of it-
self, carries little weight. Surely the State is not suggesting that it
would be constitutional to limit the marital choices of Black and
White citizens to the same degree by prohibiting any person from
marrying outside of his or her race.26 Just as racial classifications in
marriage are subject to strict scrutiny even if they limit the choices of
black and white citizens, as groups, to the same degree, the gender
classifications in Vermont's marriage laws are subject to heightened
scrutiny.
3. The State Cannot Lock Individuals into Presumed Gender Roles
The State further tries to distinguish Loving by arguing that the
anti-miscegenation laws were not only facially discriminatory, but re-
flected a deep-seated philosophy of White Supremacy.27 In striking
down Virginia's restrictions on marital choice, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that the purpose and effect of the anti-
miscegenation laws was to reflect and perpetuate attitudes about the
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged a "long line of cases un-
derstanding equal protection as a personal right." Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200,230 (1995)("[Constitution] protects persons, not groups').
25. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 84; see also State's Scholars' Brief, supra note 14, at
18; Brief Amicus Curiae of American Center for Law and Justice at 13 [hereinafter
ACLJ Briefl.
26. The State's reliance on Kohm is troubling because central features of the author's
legal analysis are so plainly wrong. See Kohm, supra note 20; State's Brief, supra note
3, at 64. For example, she ignores the profound and deeply-seated nature of racial
prejudice in this nation when she argues that "nothing about Loving was contrary to
history, nor did such an assertion require any new clear description of marriage."
Kohm, supra note 20, at 266. But see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRY op
AMERICAN LAW 497 (1985)("The Southern states did not tolerate miscegenation, as
one might expect. But neither did some Western and Northern
states... .")(Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 1); MICAEL GROSSBERG, Gov-
ERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 127
(1985)(in the nineteenth century, 38 states and commonwealths banned interracial
marriages; social prejudice accomplished the same result in the remaining
states) (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 2).
27. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 84.
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roles, social standing, and fundamental differences between and
among the races.
In fact, the very justifications the State proffers in support of its
discriminatory laws-premised on broad generalizations about pre-
sumed inherent differences between men and women-similarly
reflect, and perpetuate, deep-seated and constitutionally impermissible
gender stereotyping.8 Rather than deny that its laws are premised on
broad generalizations about the natures of men and women, the State
embraces such generalizations as grounds for maintaining sex dis-
crimination in marriage, asserting that heterosexual marriage is "a
union of differences (biological, cultural, and psychological)" and
pointing to "the rich physical and psychological differences between
the sexes that exist to this very day."2 The State asserts that, because
of these unspecified differences, 0 a marriage is only "complete" when
it includes both a man and a woman.31 In essence, the State argues
that its sex-based classifications are permissible because the generali-
zations about the psychological and cultural differences between men
and women upon which the classifications rest are true.
Courts have long recognized that legal restrictions pigeonholing
individuals on the basis of broad generalizations about gender roles, in-
cluding gender roles within the family-even when those stereotypes
28. Consistent with its equal protection analysis generally, the United States Supreme
Court has expressly rejected the suggestion that generalizations about women and
men as groups could be used to limit individual choice on the basis of gender. See
United States v. Virginia ("VMI"), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2268 (1996)("[G]eneralizations
about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no
longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
outside the average description.").
29. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 51.
30. Although the State unabashedly embraces generalized claims of "difference" to sup-
port its gender-based classifications, the State resists the invitation to actually specify
the nature of the "psychological" and "cultural" differences upon which it relies. One
amicus in support of the State has offered its view of the missing details:
By divine design, fathers are to preside over their families in love and right-
eousness and are responsible to provide the necessities of life and protection
for their families. Mothers are primarily responsible for the nurture of their
children.
The Family: A Proclamation to the World, Roman Catholic Brief at Appendix II.
31. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 50-51. The State also argues that the State has an
interest in ensuring that children can observe, and presumably learn the unspecified
gender differences the State asserts, even while admitting that there is no evidence
that "children raised by same-sex couples will develop differently in any measurable
psychological way." State's Brief, supra note 3, at 55.
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are, to some extent, rooted in empirical observation-are constitu-
tionally impermissible.32 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has
rejected the mirror image of the State's argument; in Roberts v. Jaycees,
an organization seeking to maintain gender segregation argued, like the
State here, that men and women are different, and that an association
which included both sexes would thus be fundamentally different from
the gender-segregated community the Jaycees desired. 3' The Court
castigated the Jaycees for relying "solely on unsupported generaliza-
tions about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women,"
and emphasized, "Although such generalizations may or may not have
statistical basis in fact with respect to the particular positions adopted
by the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking
that relies uncritically on such assumptions."34
Indeed, some scholars have argued that laws which so steadfastly
insist on strong differentiation between the sexes by prohibiting same-
gender sexual intimacy, or limiting marriage to different-sex couples,
not only constrain men and women to limited gender roles, but actu-
ally perpetuate the subordination of women in the same way that the
anti-miscegenation laws reflected and entrenched an ideology of
White Supremacy. 35
The State cannot justify the gender-role stereotyping inherent in
its reasoning by selectively relying on certain feminist scholarship.
Professor Carol Gilligan, a psychologist whose work forms the foun-
32. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30
(1982)(Mississippi's exclusion of males from admission to the school of nursing
"tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
jobLI ... lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become
nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling
prophecy."); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979)(alimony statute providing that
only husband may be liable for alimony impermissibly reflected and reinforced Ala-
bana's "preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife
plays a dependent role"); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975)(striking down
Utah's different ages of majority for men and women, even while acknowledging that
"[it may be true, as the Utah court observed and as is argued here, that it is the
man's primary responsibility to provide a home and that it is salutary for him to have
-education and training before he assumes that responsibility; that girls tend to mature
earlier than boys; and that females tend to marry earlier than males.").
33. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627-29 (1984).
34. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628.
35. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and
the SocialMeaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REy. 187 (1988). See also Brief Amicus
Curiae of Vermont NOW et al. at 30-33.
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dation of the State's "complementarity of the sexes" argument," took
great pains to caution that her work should not be used to support
broad generalizations about the natures of the sexes:
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender
but theme. Its association with women is an empirical obser-
vation, and it is primarily through women's voices that I
trace its development. But this association is not absolute,
and the contrasts between male and female voices are pre-
sented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of
thought and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than
to represent a generalization about either sex. 7
Similarly, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, also cited by the State in sup-
port of its broad assertions about the natures of men and women, has
similarly cautioned against overgeneralization:
I, like Carol [Gilligan], want to say that although I am
speaking of male and female voices, I am simply using those
terms as a code for what she observed to exist empirically in
those two genders. All of us have elements of both of those
voices. Those men who see themselves fitting the description
of the female voice should know that that is probably who
they are, and vice versa for women. I use that as an easy way
to talk about this material, but one that is not necessarily ac-
curate for each one of you individually.38
The State has turned the scholarship of Carol Gilligan and Carrie
Menkel-Meadow on its ear, arguing that claimed generalized differ-
ences between men and women as groups support the limitation, on
the basis of sex, of individual freedom of choice with respect to one of
the most deeply personal and important choices an individual can
make.
Moreover, the State tarnishes the very scholarship it cites by in-
voking it to justify laws of profound exclusion. The scholars upon
36. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 52-54.
37. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DE ELOPMENT 2 (1982) (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 3).
38. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 11,
53 (1985)(published dialogue among several feminist theorists).
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whom the State relies have argued that ostensibly neutral laws and
conceptions actually reflect a male viewpoint, and have worked to
construct a legal and philosophical ethic of inclusion to benefit ex-
cluded individuals, as well as society as a whole.39 Their ethic of
inclusion is not limited to women, but extends to other historically
excluded voices as well:
And what are we already learning from the gay members of
our society about the infinite human variations in relation-
ships that demonstrate the impossibility of keeping to our
neat legal categories?...
[Tlhese exclusions tell us that our common exclusions may
enable us to see that there is a vision of equality that does
not require sameness, that there is glory in diversity and dif-
ference, and that there are ways for the law to include,
accommodate, and rejoice in the social and cultural differ-
ences that both enrich our society as well as threaten to
divide it.4°
39. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women's Ways of "Knowing" Law; Feminist Legal
Epistemology, Pedagogy, and Juriprudence, in KNOWLEDGE, DIPPERENCE AND POWER
(1996)(State's Appendix Tab 11) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Women's Ways of
Knowing].
40. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making
New Voices In the Law, 42 U. Mirai L. REv. 29, 50 (1987)(Appellant's Reply Brief
Appendix Tab 18); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at
Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. Pol'y & L.. 75, 92 (199 4 )("In my
view, this analysis also provides a forceful argument for the inclusion of other groups
traditionally excluded from the law, including visible and invisible minorities, the
physically challenged, gays, and racial and ethnic minorities. Any disruption of con-
ventional and dominant group thinking must improve the quality of legal decision-
making." (emphasis added))(Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 4).
The State's argument may also prove too much. Paralleling the feminist scholar-
ship invoked by the State is a growing field of race analysis documenting generalized
differences in experiences and perceptions among the races, and arguing, like the
feminist theorists, that ostensibly neutral laws, and modes of legal education, reflect
the race-based viewpoints and biases of the white people who constructed them. See
Menkel-Meadow, Women's Ways of Knowing, supra note 39, at 60-66 (discussing
empirical research and theories of race theorists in connection with parallel feminist
scholarship). Is the State suggesting that, in light of such scholarship, laws restricting
marital choice on the basis of race (a) would not constitute invidious race discrimina-
tion, and (b) could be justified by the State's interest in acknowledging and
promoting the unique community that only a same-race (or different-race) couple
can form?
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The State cannot simply define away Appellants' fundamental
right to marry, or its own reliance on invidious gender and sexual ori-
entation-based classifications and stereotypes; when the fog lifts, all
the State is left with is a naked preference for certain families the State
esteems over other families the State relegates to second-class citizen-
ship. The State's embrace of families formed by different sex couples,
and repudiation of families formed by same-sex couples, reflects pre-
cisely the type of state favoritism that requires heightened scrutiny
under the Common Benefits Clause.'
II. EVEN MINIMUM SCRUTINY REVIEW HAS REAL "BITE"
The State does not seriously contend that any of its ratioiales
constitute compelling state interests, or that its discrimination is nar-
rowly tailored to promote such interests. 2 Indeed, the State relies
heavily on its claim that its classifications must survive only a cursory
and superficial review." The State seriously underestimates the vigor
of the Common Benefits Clause, which condemns the State's dis-
crimination in marriage even under minimum scrutiny.
First, in dismissing the minimum level of scrutiny as perfunctory,
the State fails to recognize that the intensity of this Court's review of
state classifications, even under the rubric of the most deferential level
of review, appropriately varies depending upon the context of the
case.44 As a result, the State's characterization of minimum scrutiny
41. The State suggests that Appellants have argued that the Common Benefits Clause
embodies "pure socialism." State's Brief, supra note 3, at 30. In fact, Appellants ar-
gue, and the State agrees, that the Common Benefits Clause is designed to prevent
governmental favoritism. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 18; State's Brief, supra
note 3, at 32; Brady Brief, supra note 20, at 6.
42. The State does say that if heightened scrutiny were to apply, it might offer additional
justifications. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 41 n.26. The implication is that the
State has inexplicably held back its more compelling explanations. If the State cannot
justify its laws under the most deferential review, then, a fortioi, the State cannot
satisfy heightened scrutiny.
43. See, e.g., State's Brief, supra note 3, at 41 (proffering justifications which it labels
"plausible"); State's Brief, supra note 3, at 55 (conceding that children raised by
same-sex parents do not differ in any "measurable psychological way" but attempting
to rely instead on effects which are "intangible," and thus not subject to proof or
verification).
44. In contrast to the State, Brady et al. agree with Appellants, acknowledging that rather
than adopting federal labels for heightened scrutiny, this Court applies Artide 7 "in a
nuanced manner, depending on the type of case." Brady Brief, supra note 20, at 11.
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under the Common Benefits Clause fails to account for a number of
this Court's significant, and recent, Common Benefits Clause cases,
including MacCallum v. Seymour's Administrator,5 and Brigham v.
State. 1 Appellants' observation that this Court's evaluation of a statute
is much more exacting when a classification implicates an important
right or excludes unpopular or historically disadvantaged groups, than
when the statute involves a routine tax or regulatory classification,
synthesizes all of this Court's Article 7 decisions, rather than selec-
•• 47
tively focusing only on some of those decisions.
Second, the State asserts that Appellants bear the burden of
"negat[ing] every conceivable justification for the statute." 8 Even un-
der a minimum scrutiny review, the State cannot elude its obligation
to justify its discrimination by shifting the responsibility for proving a
negative to others. As this Court has explained in analyzing a Com-
mon Benefits challenge to a municipal classification, "Once the
classification has been shown to exist, and its effect on the complain-
ing party made clear, the municipality must then justify that
Unfortunately, Brady et al. then strain to argue that a more exacting review does not
apply in this case, essentially asserting that the Vermont Constitution displays greater
reverence for the right to an education than the fundamental right to marry, see Brady
Brief, supra note 20, at 11-18, and viewing the Vermont Constitution as frozen in
time, rather than a living, forward-looking document. See Brady Brief, supra note 20,
at 3 ("The Common Benefits Clause and the marriage statutes were considered con-
sistent within the original context of the Vermont Constitution."). This Court has
repudiated such a stagnant conception of the Vermont Constitution. See Appellants'
Brief, supra note 3, at 19; see also Brief of Appellee Virginia, in United States Su-
preme Court appeal of Loving v. Virginia at 9-31 (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix
Tab 5)(arguing that anti-miscegenation laws were consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment when it was adopted).
The Brady Brief also purports to analyze this Court's two most recent cases con-
cerning Article 7, admonishing Appellants for fiiling to do the same, even though
one, Quesnel v. Town of Middlebury, 167 Vt. 252 (1997), never even mentioned
Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, and the other, L'Esperance v. Town of
Charlotte, 167 Vt. 162 (1997), expressly applied a standard of review developed for
municipal lease agreements, and is thus of limited applicability here.
45. See MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452 (1996).
46. See Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246 (1997).
47. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 24-27. Justice Thurgood Marshall advocated a
similar multifactor, sliding-scale approach under federal equal protection law, urging
the United States Supreme Court to adopt a balancing test for federal equal protec-
tion review, taking into account (1) the "relative importance to individuals.., of the
governmental benefits" involved, (2) the "character of the classification in question,"
and (3) the asserted state interests. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 318 (1976)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 34.
[Vol. 6:1
FREEDOM TO MARRY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
classification." 9 As noted above, the State's burden is particularly
meaningful in cases in which the Court has reason to infer improper
motive, or when important rights are at stake.5"
Finally, the State relies heavily on federal equal protection law,
which, viewed in its full complement, provides no sanctuary for the
State's discrimination.5 Like the Common Benefits Clause, the fed-
eral Equal Protection Clause requires the State to demonstrate a
legitimate justification, independent of the bare desire to disadvantage
a particular group, to support its classifications.52 Even under federal
49. Colchester Fire Dist. No. 2 v. Sharrow, 145 Vt. 195, 199 (1984); see also Lorrain v.
Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 215 (1993)(concluding that the rationales provided in support of
statute did not support the discriminatory classifications); State v. Ludlow Supermar-
kets, 141 Vt. 261, 269 (1982)("Mhere is a duty on the State to demonstrate that
any impingement on the right of citizens... is a mere incident, and that the objec-
tives cannot be otherwise reached." (emphasis added)).
50. See, e.g., Brigham, 166 Vt. at 246 ("The State has not provided a persuasive rationale
for the undisputed inequities in the current educational funding system." (emphasis
added)); MacCallum, 165 Vt. at 453 (considering and rejecting two rationales prof-
fered by state in support of statute). The State also claims that the factual
assumptions underlying its asserted justifications are exempt from any judicial reality-
check. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 34 ("The Court is not even permitted to take
evidence on the matter."); State's Brief, supra note 3, at 37 ("The connection (and
the statute) will be upheld where the assumptions are unprovable and subjective.").
Appellants do not believe the State has even articulated a sufficiently compelling or
legitimate justification to survive Appellants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings;
even if it had, this Court certainly could not uphold the State's discrimination with-
out reviewing the "factual assumptions" the State has drawn out of thin air. See
Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 27-28.
51. As Appellants have noted, federal equal protection law establishes minimum consti-
tutional protections-a lowest common denominator-above and beyond which the
Vermont Supreme Court can and often has built. See Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 157 Vt.
461, 464 (1991)("[Tlhe Vermont Constitution is freestanding and may require this
Court to examine more closely distinctions drawn by state government than would
the Fourteenth Amendment."). Although the federal law cases that the State cites
may offer persuasive reasoning for this Court to consider, they do not, in any event,
govern this case.
52. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)("By requiring that the classifi-
cation bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end,
we ensure that classifications are not drawn for-the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law."). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63-65
(1982)(purpose of favoring established residents over new residents, underlying divi-
dend program which paid more to long term residents than others, was improper);
U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973)("[I]f the constitutional concep-
tion of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group [in this case "hippies"]
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."). Cf State v. Ludlow Super-
markets, 141 Vt. 261, 269 (1982)("[The] objective of favoring one part of the
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equal protection principles, the State cannot justify its gender-based
classifications by merely asserting presumed gender roles, or justify its
burdens on gay and lesbian citizens by merely asserting that it prefers
heterosexuals; in so doing, the State demonstrates an improper pur-
pose.
Moreover, just as this Court has looked at the State's justifica-
tions much more closely when classifications appear to be based on
improper purposes, the United States Supreme Court has done the
same. For example, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center," that Court
considered a city's differential zoning treatment of a group home for
the mentally retarded. The Court insisted that the city's
"vague... fears" of harm from the group home,54 where no such fears
arise with regard to other similarly situated persons, and "the negative
attitude of the majority" of neighbors," were not legitimate bases for
its discrimination.56
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a law that
imposed such a "broad and undifferentiated disability" on gay and
lesbian citizens that the State of Colorado's proffered justifications
made little sense, and the inference of animus was inescapable.' 7 In
Romer, as in Cleburne, the high court did not try to invent a hypo-
thetical "conceivable justification" to justify the discriminatory
classifications, or reflexively embrace the ostensibly legitimate pur-
poses proffered in support of the laws, but actually subjected the
proferred justifications to a bona fide reality check and struck down
51the laws in question under a rational basis review.
community over another is totally irreconcilable with the Vermont Constitution....
The purpose of the preferential legislation must be to further a goal independent of
the preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny.").
53. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985).
54. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
55. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
56. Cleburne, 473 U.S.. at 449-50. Cf MacCallum v. Seymour's'Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452,
459-62 (1996)(carefully evaluating and rejecting justifications for classification dis-
advantaging adopted children). Indeed, under the federal rational basis test, even
when there is no suggestion of an improper purpose, the state's justification "must
find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation." Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
57. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)(state cannot "deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws" by enacting laws making gay and lesbian citizens "unequal to eve-
yone else").
58. It is ironic that the State and its amici make such an effort to criticize and distinguish
Romer. The Court in Romer held what this Court has held all along: a state cannot
merely assert a bald preference or favoritism for a portion of its citizenry, rendering
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The United States Supreme Court's careful examination of gov-
ernment justifications, and the link between those justifications and
its discrimination, in Cleburne and Romer, contrasts with the more
cursory review that Court has applied to more benign classifications,
and to justifications that do not suggest any particular improper
motive.59
Like this Court's Common Benefits Clause minimum scrutiny
analysis, the United States Supreme Court's rational basis review is
nuanced. Federal rational basis analysis law is not entirely reflected in
Beach, Romer, Cleburne, or any other individual case, and it would be
inaccurate to suggest otherwise;0 these federal cases are all part of the
constellation of federal cases that collectively embody federal rational
basis review. Regardless of whether this Court turns to federal case law
for guidance, or relies exclusively on its own Common Benefits Clause
jurisprudence, the State cannot in this case satisfy even the minimum
level of scrutiny because it cannot demonstrate any legitimate public
purpose, but rather relies on a bare desire to privilege different-sex
couples and the families they form together over same-sex couples and
their families.
those outside of the preferred class second-class citizens. See State v. Ludlow Super-
markets, 141 Vt. 261, 269 (1982). For a thoughtfil analysis and defense of Romer,
see Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romers Rightness, 95 MicH. L.
REv. 203 (1996).
59. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 317 (1993)(upholding dis-
tinction between cable television facilities that served buildings under common
ownership or management and those facilities that served separately owned and
managed properties). The United States Supreme Court has embraced the one-
step-at-a-time approach to justifying governmental classifications in cases like
Beach, involving tax, economic, and cash benefit programs which depend on blunt
classifications to operate in an efficient and viable manner. Contrary to the State's
suggestion that it may act in a "step-by-step" manner in this case, State's Brief, su-
pra note 3, at 35, the United States Supreme Court does not tolerate ill-fitting
means and ends in those cases meriting a more skeptical scrutiny, such as Cleburne
and Romer.
60. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 33-37; see also State's Scholars' Brief, supra note 14,
at 23-25 (describing federal equal protection rational basis analysis as that reflected
in Beach and Heller, but failing to acknowledge role of Romer and Cleburne in guiding
that analysis).
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III. THE STATE CANNOT DEFEND THE PROFOUND DISABILITY
IT HAS IMPOSED ON APPELLANTS
A. "Procreation"Is a Post Hoc Rationalization Designed to
Exclude Appellants from Marriage
The State relies heavily on the biological differences between men
and women to support its discrimination. By pointing to "procreation,"
the State seeks to imbue those biological differences with a legal sig-
nificance, suggesting that procreation is a defining attribute of
marriage, and that State policies concerning procreation justify the
discriminatory marriage laws. The State's resort to "procreation" is
not surprising, given that it is the only basis upon which the State can
even try to distinguish committed same-sex couples from committed
different sex couples. As a Justice of New Zealand's highest court
noted:
[C]ohabitation, commitment, intimacy, and financial inter-
dependence-are not unique to heterosexual relationships.
Nor are a number of other qualities such as companionship,
mutuality, empathy, devotion, sharing, supportiveness, and
sensitivity peculiarly the province of heterosexual cou-
ples .... [U]nless procreation is pressed to predominate over
all other attributes of the marriage relationship, the raison
d'etre ... for perceiving marriage as necessarily and exclu-
sively heterosexual in its essential composition must fail.61 '
An analysis of the marriage laws belies the State's suggestion that
the defining attribute of marriage is procreation. Moreover, the State's
discrimination is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling gov-
61. Quilter v. Attorney General, No. 200/96, slip op. at 18 (N.Z. Ct. App. Dec. 17,
1997)(Thomas, J.)(State's Appendix Tab 7). In the Quilter decision, the court upheld
New Zealand's different-sex restriction in marriage on statutory grounds. In New
Zealand, in conitrast to Vermont, the Bill of Rights is not a supreme law, and cannot
be invoked to invalidate a statute. See Quilter, No. 200/96, slip op. at 29 (Thomas,
J.)(State's Appendix Tab 7). Accordingly, although several Justices (on both sides of
the issue) addressed the effect of New Zealand's Bill of Rights on that nation's gender
restriction in marriage, resolution of the "constitutional" question was not necessary
for disposition of the case.
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ernment purpose relating to procreation and reproduction; indeed, it
is not even reasonably related to a valid public purpose.
1."Procreation" Is Not Essential to Marriage
The State dismisses Appellants' view that the primary purpose of
marriage is to protect and encourage committed relationships as
"conjecture," and asserts instead that procreation, or the ability to
procreate, is the defining feature of marriage. However, the marriage
laws reinforce Appellants' view, and provide no support for the
State's: in exchange for allowing two people to legally marry, the State
requires that they make a legally-enforceable commitment to one an-
other which obligates them to remain married unless and until the
State decrees otherwise. The State emphatically does not require the
applicants to agree to procreate, or even to be able to procreate. In-
deed, the State does not even require, as a condition of a valid
marriage, that the two intend to, and have the ability to, engage in
sexual relations.
The State asserts that this glaring omission of any "procreation"
requirement in the marriage laws "speaks more to notions of privacy
than to qualifications to marry."62 However, an analysis of Vermont's
divorce and annulment laws undercuts the State's assertion. As one
commentator has explained,
[T]he law has rarely shrunk from impractical or intrusive in-
quiries when a marriage is terminated. The legally
recognized grounds for ending a marriage logically should
refer to the conditions under which a marriage fails to live
up to its legally recognized purposes. If a central purpose of
marriage is procreation, then surely this purpose will be re-
63flected in the law of divorce and annulment ....
Although Vermont's divorce and annulment laws do reflect a solici-
tude for the unitive aspects of the marital relationship (for example,
listing wilful desertion, intolerable severity, nonsupport, and separa-
tion with no reasonable probability of resumption of marital relations
62. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 68.
63. William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right ofPrivacy, 103 YALE LJ.
1495, 1514 (1994).
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as grounds for divorce)6 nothing in those laws supports the suggestion
that procreation, or even the ability to procreate, is an essential com-
ponent of marriage.
This Court's 19th century decisions in Ryder v. Ryder,65 and Le-
Barron v. LeBarronf both granting annulments on the ground of
"physical incapacity," do not suggest otherwise. 67 Courts have been
very clear that the historical "physical capacity" requirement does not
relate to procreation at all but, rather, is designed to ensure satisfac-
tory intimate sexual relations within marriage. As a New York court
explained in refusing to annul the marriage of a woman whose ovaries
had been surgically removed:
It is a fact well known to medical science, and familiar in'our
common experience, that every woman passes through a
climacteric period... after which she is incapable of con-
ception, and yet it has never been suggested that a woman
who has undergone this experience is incapable of entering
the marriage state .... It seems to us clear, therefore, that it
cannot be held, as a matter of law, that the possession of the
organs necessary to conception are essential to entrance to
the marriage state, so long as there is no impediment to the
indulgence of the passions incident to this state.6"
In fact, "consummation" is not, as the State suggests, a necessary
element to a valid marriage. Once parties fulfill the statutory
64. VT. STT.A. .tit. XV, § 551 (1989).
65. Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158 (1894).
66. LeBarron v. LeBarron, 35 Vt. 365 (1862).
67. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 17-18.
68. Wendel v. Wendel, 52 N.Y.S. 72, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898). See also Schroter v.
Schroter, 107 N.Y. Supp. 1065-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1907)(barrenness alone not
ground for annulment); Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 111 A. 697, 699 (N.J.
1920)(mere sterility does not constitute impotence); Hohengarten, supra note 63, at
1516-17 (the law of divorce and annulment "draws a sharp line between sexual ac-
tivity as such and the ability to procreate.").
69. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 11. Some of the State's amici argue that only one
particular act of different-sex sexual intimacy achieves unitive significance, and all
other sexual relations, whether between different-sex couples or same sex couples, are
qualitatively inferior, thereby justifying the State's discriminatory laws. See ACLJ
Brief, supra note 25, at 5-12. See also Brady Brief, supra note 20, at 24. This moral
argument is nothing more than a fundamentally theological claim posing as "natural
law." See Andrew H. Friedman, Same Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Aban-
doning ScripturaZ Canonical and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35
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requirements for solemnizing a marriage, they are married, regardless
of whether they share any form of sexual intimacy at all.70 The inabil-
ity of one of the marital partners to perform sexually has never
prevented a Vermont couple from validly marrying and remaining
married; physical incapacity renders a marriage "voidable" at the in-
stance of the aggrieved party, not "void ab initio" even if both parties
wish to be married.7'
HowARD L.J. 173, 179-87 (1992)(tracing position here articulated by ACLJ through
St. Augustine, Gratian, and Aquinas, and explaining the intersection between
"natural law," canon law, and religious thought); WiLui EsKRIDGE, Tm CAsE FOR
SAME-SEx MARRIAGE 98 (1996)("The new natural law advocates are essentially
dressing up a sectarian religious argument in philosophical garb.").
Moreover, "natural law" itself is subject to widely-ranging interpretations. For
example, Richard Duncan, relied upon by the State, embraces the view that
"homosexual conduct... is 'intrinsically shamefl, immoral, and indeed depraved or
depraving,'" or, at a minimum, that "it lacks sufficient goodness to qualify for access
to a governmentally-endorsed and specially-preferred status such as marriage." Dun-
can, supra note 20, at 594 (quoting John Finnis). John Finnis, also heavily cited by
the amici in support of the State, concurs that same-sex intimacy is "depraved," and
indeed condemns as immoral all non-procreative sexual activity, including
"deliberately contracepted" sex within marriage. See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of
Homosexual Conduct A Response to John Finnis, 9 NoTE DAME J.L. ETHiCS & PuB.
PoL'Y 41, 45, 54-61 (1995). On the other hand, other philosophers assert that same-
sex unions partake of the same elements as other moral sexual activity. See, e.g., Ste-
phen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 269
(1995) (refuting John Finnis' natural law theory that non-procreative sexual intimacy
is immoral).
The State has wisely dropped any such "morality"-based defense on appeal. Cf
P.C., supra note 4, at 65. This Court should not embrace unadorned preferences for
one segment of the community over another under the guise of "morality." See
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996)(rejecting claim that personal or religious
objections to homosexuality of some members of the community can justify dis-
crimination against gay and lesbian citizens).
70. See In re Marriage of Burnside, 777 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989)("consummation" not necessary to validate a marriage); Anderson v. Anderson,
219 N.E.2d 317, 329 (Ohio C. P. 1966); see also Beck v. Beck, 246 So. 2d 420 (Ala.
1971) (sexual activity not essential for valid common law marriage).
71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. XV, § 512 (1989). In fact, a party who wanted to void a marriage
due to the other's physical incapacity to perform sexually could not historically do so
if that party was aware of the limitations at the time of the marriage. See, e.g., Jarzem
v. Bierhaus, 415 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)("[I]f the wife's claim for
annulment or divorce had been based upon the fact that the husband was impotent,
it would have been unavailing if she had knowledge of such a fact before the mar-
riage."); Rickards v. Rickards, 166 A.2d 425, 427 (Del. 1960); Fehr v. Fehr, 112 A.
486, 486 (NJ. Ch. 1920). Certainly same gender couples would be well aware, prior
to marriage, of the limitations on their ability to procreate.
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Nor do the United States Supreme Court decisions quoted by the
State imply that procreation is essential to marriage. In its most recent
detailed analysis of the purposes of marriage, and the nature of the
fundamental right to marry, that Court listed mutual emotional sup-
port, public commitment, legal and economic benefits, spiritual
significance, and consummation as the primary attributes of mar-
riage.72 Significantly, the Court did not include conceiving or raising
children together on its list.73
Moreover, in relying on the United States Supreme Court's dis-
cussion, in Zablocki v. Redhail,74 the State leaps from that Court's
preference for child-rearing by married couples (a policy directly un-
dermined by the State's discrimination in this case, since many same-
sex couples raise children) to the State's purported view that procrea-
tion is a defining attribute of marriage. In the discussion quoted by the
State, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that the decision
to marry, in and of itself, enjoys the same level of constitutional im-
portance as "decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child
rearing, and family relationships," 75 and is not merely instrumental to
any of the other protected rights.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court made that distinction
clear in the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,76 upholding a state statute
which denied a child's biological father standing to assert his parent-
age when the child's mother was married to another man. In that case,
the state's solicitude for the integrity of the mother's existing mar-
riage, as well as its preference for parenting by two married parents,
was so strong that the state essentially cut off the biological father's
parental rights. In other words, the state invoked the existence of a
marriage to actually sever the link between procreation and child-
rearing.
72. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (19 87) (upholding prison inmate's right to
marry).
73. The State seizes on the Court's indusion of "consummation" as an element of mar-
riage in its Turner decision. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 69 n.56. However, in
conduding that most prison inmate marriages are celebrated with the expectation that
they will ultimately be consummated, the United States Supreme Court conceded
that some such marriages are never "consummated." See Turner, 482 U.S. at 96. The
Court's recognition of a constitutional right to marry is not limited to the former set
of marriages.
74. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 69.
75. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
76. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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The State's effort to confine marriage to procreative relationships
resurrects a fierce debate regarding the morality of sexual intimacy
without procreation and the role of women within our society.
Throughout much of our nation's history, many states have prohib-
ited artificial birth control.7 Among the more vocal defenders of such
laws were Roman Catholic moralists, who "stressed the origins of the
doctrine on contraception in natural law:"
God intended marital intercourse primarily for the purpose
of procreation.... Certain secondary purposes of inter-
course in marriage-such as the relief of concupiscent desires
or the expression of connubial affection-were morally licit,
but to frustrate unnaturally the primary purpose of inter-
course while pursuing its secondary ones perverted the
divinely ordained nature of the act.78
Although the moral debate continues, the United States Supreme
Court ended the legal debate once and for all in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,79 upholding a married couple's right to use contraceptives-that
is, the right not to procreate.8
In sum, the State's effort to define away the constitutional issue
in this case by equating marriage with procreation, or the ability to
procreate, is totally unavailing. The State has always licensed mar-
riages between elderly, sterile, and even impotent parties. Indeed, the
Vermont and United States Constitutions would not likely counte-
nance restrictions on the marriage rights of the elderly or infertile.81
The only people upon whom the State seeks to impose a "procreation"
requirement are same-sex couples. The State cannot simply define
77. See generally DAviD M. KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1970)(chronicling
history of laws restricting contraception in the United States).
78. KENNEDY, supra note 77, at 145 (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 6).
79. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972)(acknowledging "right of
the individua4 married or single... [to decide] whether to bear or beget a child" and
upholding unmarried persons' right of access to contraceptives).
81. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On The Antimiscegenation
Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U.L. Rxv. 981, 1012 (1991)("One of the more disappointing
aspects surrounding this 'procreation argument' is that numerous courts accept it,
conveniently forgetting that they would never allow a statute to stand that prohibited
infertile heterosexuals from marrying." (citation omitted)).
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away its discrimination by referring to procreation; it must justify that
discrimination. 2
2. The State Confuses the Relationships Between Procreation,
Child-Rearing, and Marriage
The State attempts to justify its discrimination with reference to
three concepts: (1) the act of conceiving a child through sexual rela-
tions ("procreation") (which it knows same-sex couples cannot
accomplish without the use of reproductive technology); (2) the re-
sponsibility of raising a child ("child-rearing") (which many same-sex
couples, including two of the Appellant couples, have assumed); and
(3) civil marriage.
The nexus between the latter two concepts might well constitute
an important state interest (that is, the State may have an interest in
promoting two-parent families, or families in which a child's parents
are married to one another), 3 but the State does not, and could not,
rely on such an interest in this case because the State's discrimination
runs directly counter to such an interest. The State simply could not
plausibly argue that preventing Holly and Lois from marrying some-
how promotes child-rearing by married parents or benefits the
daughter they are raising together. Moreover, significantly, the State
has properly conceded that there is no evidence that "children raised
by same-sex couples will develop differently in any measurable psy-
chological way," acknowledging that such an argument would be "an
easy target to shoot down."" Accordingly, in evaluating the State's
argument, this Court must first peel away any claims relating to the
82. See also Quilter v. Attorney General, No. 200/96, slip op. at 18 (N.Z. Ct. App. Dec.
17, 1997)(Thomas, J.)("I do not apprehend that in this day and age the notion that
procreation is the sole or major purpose of marriage commands significant sup-
port.")(State's Appendix Tab 7); Barbara A. Robb, The Constitutionality of the
DOMA in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 Naw ENG. L. Rav. 263, 317
(1997) (noting that procreation is not cited as an underpinning of marriage unless gay
people are seeking marriage).
83. The State's assertion that Appellants have conceded that furthering the link between
procreation and child rearing is a valid public purpose is a gross distortion of the rec-
ord. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 44. Appellants argued below, as they argue
now, that promotingparental responsibility and two parent families are valid purposes,
but that the State's discrimination against them does not in any way promote those
purposes and, in fact, undermines them. See PC, supra note 4, at 166.
84. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 55.
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State's interest in responsible parenting, or its interest in parenting by
married (as opposed to unmarried) parents, since those interests do
not distinguish Appellants from any different sex couples who might
seek to marry and possibly raise children.85
What is left is the State's asserted interest in the nexus between
the first two categories, procreation and child-rearing, and its claim
that its discriminatory marriage laws somehow fortify that nexus. Ap-
pellants have already argued that the State's emphasis on biological
parenting is misplaced.
8 6
Moreover, the relationship between the State's discrimination
and its claimed interest is highly speculative and strained. The parent-
age laws, not the marriage laws, regulate and reinforce the relationship
between procreation and child-rearing. In Vermont a married man is
free to prove that he did not father his wife's child, and thus has no
parental responsibilities with respect to that child, and a putative bio-
logical father is free to invoke the parentage laws to establish his
parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a child whose
mother is married to another man.87
The State's invocation of the presumption that a child born dur-
ing a marriage is the child of the mother's husband to support its
position is surprising.88 To the extent the presumption of parentage
impacts the procreation-child rearing link at all, in cases in which a
child is conceived through extra-marital sex, the presumption actually
undermines the link between procreation (the act of conception) and
child-rearing in an effort to promote the link between child-rearing
and marriage (again, a link which supports Appellants' claims in this
case). In particular, the presumption reflects a policy preference for
child-rearing by the married couple rather than the actual biological
father who conceived the child.8"
85. For example, Appellants agree with the State's recognition that single parent families
do not have all of the benefits of families with two parents. See State's Brief, supra
note 3, at 43. Appellants concur that "It is in the family that a child first learns about
honesty, trustworthiness, obedience, sacrifice, selflessness, and reverence for the basic
freedoms we all enjoy." Roman Catholic Brief, supra note 20, at 8. Appellants also
agree that the institution of marriage should be strengthened in a manner that pro-
motes a sense of responsibility to children. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Agudath Israel
at 1-2.
86. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 34.
87. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. XV § 308 (Supp. 1998).
88. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 42.
89. Empirical observation supports the conclusion that a marital relationship frequently
severs the link between procreation and child-rearing. Physicians who do tissue typing
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Finally, the State here asserts an interest in promoting the link
between procreation and child-rearing but fails to explain why, rather
than making all biological parents marry each other, or requiring all
married couples to conceive and raise children, or licensing procrea-
tion rather than marriage, the State imposes legal disabilities on one,
and only one, class of couples. The State responds to these points by
denying the applicability of the compelling interest test, and eviscer-
ating the force of minimum scrutiny review.90 The State is wrong on
both counts: The compelling interest test does apply in this case,"
and, even if it did not, the minimum level of scrutiny would not be as
toothless as the State argues. 2 The disjuncture between the State's goal
and its means in this case does not merely represent some slippage
around the edges; it is a chasm miles wide.
3. The "Reproductive Technology" Argument Is a Sham
One out of every eight heterosexual married couples in the
United States is infertile. 3 In pursuit of their goal of raising children
together, such couples sometimes turn to donor insemination, which
accounts for eight to ten times more births than all other types of re-
productive technology combined."4  The first successful donor
insemination in the United States was recorded in 1884, and the
number of children born through donor insemination in the United
States has risen from about 1,000 per year through the 1940s-1960s,
to 30,000 in 1987.9' Far less common are so-called "surrogacy" ar-
rangements whereby a "surrogate mother" bears a child, either with
her own egg or a donor egg, and then relinquishes her parental rights
for organ donations estimate that between five and twenty percent of children are not
actually biologically related to the men who daim fatherhood. See BARBARAKA rz
RoTHMAN, RECRE.ATNG MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN PATRIAR-
cHAL SocrTy 225 (1989)(Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 7).
90. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 44-45.
91. See supra Section I.
92. See supra Section II.
93. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 35.
94. See EDWARD E. WALLACH & HOwARD A. ZACUR, REPRODU-TIVE MEDICINE AND
SURGERY 782 (1995) (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 8).
95. SeeWALLACH, supra note 94, at 781-82.
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to the intended parents (usually the biological father and his wife)
upon the birth of the child.96
Even though the Vermont legislature has never taken any action
to regulate the use of such methods of reproduction-and in fact has
codified a decision of this Court protecting the family rights of par-
ents and children in the donor insemination context,97 the State now
contends that the legislature intends to restrict the proliferation of
such methods. The State justifies its goal by arguing that the use of
such methods of reproduction leads to undesirable litigation regarding
parental rights. The State's claim is dubious, as a regime in which le-
gal categories do not match the reality of peoples' lives-such as one
in which two adults who have built a family together are considered
legal strangers-generates more litigation than one in which the legal
rules more closely match the reality of peoples' lives.98
Most astonishing, though, is the State's view of the means by
which the legislature purportedly seeks to promote its goal. The State
takes no action to regulate in any way the conduct of the large major-
ity of the consumers of such methods (infertile heterosexual couples).
Instead, the State imposes a unique disability on a small portion of the
potential consumers of such methods (some same-sex couples), as well
as the much larger category of citizens who do not, and would not use
such methods (same-sex couples who bring children into their families
through prior relationships' or adoption, or who form families without
children). The State does not explain why its restrictions are arbitrar-
ily targeted at only a small minority of consumers of donor
insemination and surrogacy contracts. If the State's claim were for
real, and not a post-hoc rationalization contrived in an attempt to
justify its discrimination, the State would not simply ignore the vast
96. Although statistics are hard to come by, one expert has estimated that between 5,000
and 10,000 surrogate births have occurred in the United States. See HELENA RAGONE,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 88 (1994)(Appellant's Re-
ply Brief Appendix Tab 9). Belying the State's intimation that gay male couples have
been involved in a significant portion of these arrangements, see State's Brief, supra
note 3, at 57 n.44, all of the surrogacy cases identified by the State as well as the law
review articles cited by the State involved infertile heterosexual couples, not gay male
couples. In fact, the overwhelming majority of couples who seek the services of surro-
gates are heterosexual couples.
97. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. xv § 1-102(b)(1989); In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993).
98. See infra note 103.
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majority of donor insemination and surrogacy consumers and target
an unfortunate few.9
B. The State' Doomsday Speculations Cannot Survive
Constitutional Scrutiny
Both the State and its amici intimate that if Holly can marry Lois
after twenty five years of commitment together, the proverbial Pan-
dora's Box will be opened. The State makes vague predictions of
"'intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems,"""0
"unpredictable and significant" effects on marriage, 01 and polygamous
marriages. 02
Such alarmist claims are unfounded. Vermont will be the same
state after it allows same-sex couples to marry as it is now, but with
more family security and peace of mind, and less hardship and dis-
crimination. First, the availability of civil marriage to same-sex
couples will create a "bright line" status, giving rise to "reliable ex-
pectations that stabilize not only the determination of legal rights and
99. See State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, 141 Vt. 261, 266 (1982)("[W]hatever our duty to
give validity and credit to stated legislative purposes, we are not required to accept as
underpinning for any law a purpose that, through wide-ranging exceptions or other
emasculating devices, the legislature has reduced to a sham or deceit."). Not only does
the exclusion of everyone except same-sex couples from the State's efforts to discour-
age its disfavored methods of reproduction render the State's claimed justification a
sham, but it raises constitutional red flags of its own. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972)("'Mhere is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to requite that the principles of law
which officials impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely,
nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were af-
fected.'"(citation omitted)).
The State also fails to adequately explain how limiting same-sex couples' mar-
riage rights will affect their reproductive decisions, especially given that the
legislature has already provided for adoption by same-sex partners. The State sim-
ply asserts, without support, "The Legislature could reasonably conclude that the
increased financial stability and access to legal benefits that accompany marital
status would lead to an increase in technologically-assisted conception." State's
Brief, supra note 3, at 57.
100. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 91.
101. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 47.
102. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 27 & n.14.
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duties, but also the entire social, economic, and political structure."10 3
Second, same-sex couples and their children will be free from the tan-
gible legal disadvantages they currently encounter,"" as well as the
stigmatizing badge of second-class citizenship.'' Third, there is no
sound reason to believe that heterosexual couples will cease marrying
(and raising children, for that matter), or that their unions will be less
106
stable or valuable just because Stan and Peter are also able to marry.
Indeed, the sky certainly has not fallen in those Scandinavian
countries that have extended virtually all rights associated with mar-
riage to same-sex couples. Even detractors "acknowledge their
concerns may have been overblown." 07 Nor has the State of Vermont
suffered social ill as a result of providing state employees in same-sex
relationships with some of the same employee benefits as their hetero-
sexual counterparts.
Neither can the State justify its continuing discrimination against
same-sex couples by raising the specter of polygamy. Ending discrimi-
nation in marriage against same-sex couples will hardly make
legalization of multiple-partner marriages inevitable any more than
ending race discrimination did. Appellants do not challenge the
103. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status ofMarriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy, 81
MICH. L Rnv. 463, 485 (1983). This Court has grappled with the sometimes tragic
consequences that result when the applicable or available legal categories don't match
the reality of peoples' lives. See Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373 (1997)(affirming
Superior Court's refusal to use equity powers to resolve child custody and visitation
claim of child's de facto coparent because coparent had no legal relationship to child).
Cf Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83 (1985)(acknowledging some legal relationship
between stepparent and child by virtue of marriage).
104. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 3-5.
105. See MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 459-60 (1996)(recognizing psy-
chological harm from legal rules that inflict second class status, especially with respect
to family matters).
106. Any suggestion that the State has only a fixed number of marriage licenses such that a
license issued to Nina and Stacy will result in one less heterosexual marriage is en-
tirely untethered to reality.
107. Lawrence Ingrassia, Danes Don't Debate Same-Sex Marriages, They Celebrate Them;
Even Opponents Say '89 Law Brought No Social lls, WALL Snvarr J., June 8, 1994, at
Al (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 10). As the State has noted, the Scandina-
vian countries that do extend marital rights to same-sex couples (Sweden, Denmark,
and Norway) withhold access to adoption and reproductive technology from such
couples. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 57-58 n.47. Given that Vermont already
protects the procreative and parenting rights of same-sex couples, this limitation on
the marriage tights of same-sex couples in the Scandinavian countries is inapposite.
Moreover, Vermont's experience with adoptions by same-sex couples defies dooms-
day predictions.
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fundamental structure of marriage as the union of two individuals;
rather, the fundamental right upon which they rely is the "freedom to
join in marriage with the person of one's choice."' 8 The point is not
merely semantic; the exclusivity of marriage flows from the compan-
ionate vision of marriage as two people pledging themselves to one
another that courts have long embraced.0 9 Moreover, even if this
Court recognized a fundamental right to marry that was broader than
Appellants seek, the State would still be entitled to maintain reason-
able restrictions, such as bans on consanguineous or polygamous
marriages, that were supported by adequate justifications."0
In fact, the State's repeated allusions to the peril of polygamous
marriages echo the arguments of the Commonwealth of Virginia in
defending that state's race requirement in marriage."
In sum, although there is no doubt that an end to discrimination
in marriage will profoundly affect the lives of the families presently
excluded from that institution, and will benefit the community as a
whole, there is simply no basis for the parade of horribles that the
State and its amici present."
108. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1948)(emphasis added).
109. Ironically, by seeking to redefine marriage as an instrument for procreation, rather
than an institution for fostering and promoting love and commitment between two
people, it is the State, not Appellants, that pushes the law toward recognizing po-
lygamous marriages. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 27, 68 n.54.
110. Commentators across the political spectrum have explained and justified the prohibi-
tion of polygamous marriages on a variety of bases. See, e.g., Teresa S. Collett,
Marriage, Family and the Positive Law, 10 NoTE DAmE J. L. ETncs & Pun. POL'Y
467, 475 (1996)(polygamous marriages create inequality within companionate mar-
riage); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polgamy
and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rav. 1501 (1997)(polygamy undermines mod-
ern liberal state).
111. See excerpted United States Supreme Court oral argument transcripts from Loving v.
Virginia, in MAY rr PLWasa THE CoURT 277, 282-83 (Peter Irons & Stephanie
Guitton eds., 1993)(Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 11)("[T]he state's prohi-
bition of interracial marriage.., stands on the same footing as the prohibition of
polygamous marriage, or incestuous marriage, or the prescription of minimum ages at
which people may marry, and the prevention of the marriage of people who are
mentally incompetent.")(quoting Virginia Assistant Attorney General IL D. McIl-
waine, arguing for Virginia).
112. The Christian Legal Society argues that allowing same-sex couples to marry will bur-
den the religious freedom of "those who believe homosexual conduct is sinful."
Christian Legal Society Brief, supra note 20, at 2. However, those amici's arguments
are actually directed at laws prohibitifig discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in general. All of the hypothetical situations described by these amici could just
as easily arise today, under current Vermont law; recognition of civil marriage
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C. The Former Sodomy Laws Are a Red Herring
Vermont does not criminalize adult consensual sexual conduct
between either same-sex or different-sex couples. Vermont's historical
prohibition of sodomy, which the State describes as "an act commonly
associated with homosexuality,"" 3 is irrelevant. The Vermont Su-
preme Court held in 1899 that because sodomy was a crime by the
common law of England, it was a criminal offense in the State of
Vermont."4 Although the definition of "sodomy" at common law was
far from uniform, that such criminal prohibitions applied to different-
sex and same-sex sexual intimacy alike was not disputed." 5 Indeed,
heterosexual married couples were historically subject to prosecution
under the sodomy laws."
6
By the same token, like the common law prohibition, Vermont's
modern "fellation" statute, enacted in 1937 and repealed in 1977, ap-
plied by its terms to same-sex and different-sex conduct alike. That
statute prohibited sexual conduct practiced by 80% of married hetero-
sexual couples today.117 If the State's logic is correct, then heterosexual
couples have no fundamental right to marry since, through much of
between partners of the same gender will not alter the applicable legal analysis or in-
crease the likelihood of such tensions between Vermont's antidiscrimination laws and
some people's religious opposition to gay and lesbian relationships.
113. State's Brief, supra note 1, at 66.
114. SeeStatev. LaForrest, 71 Vt. 311,312 (1899).
115. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YAu LJ. 1073, 1085, 1088
(1988)("American sodomy laws in force when the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment were ratified applied to acts performed by men with women as well as
with one another .... Although illicit sexual acts were seen as sinful, immoral,
criminal, or all three, before the 1870s illicit sexual acts between men were not seen
as fundamentally different from, or necessarily worse than, illicit acts between a man
and a woman."); Larry Cati Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality
Tale About the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRim. L.
37, 50-55, 76 (1993)(original sodomy laws were meant to prevent certain sexual
practices, "performed by whomever," and were not enacted as anti-homosexual
measures).
116. See, e.g., People v. Doggett, 188 P.2d 792 (Cal. App. 1948)(prosecution of hetero-
sexual married couple for "crime against nature").
117. See ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 140
(1995)(Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix Tab 12). By the same token, many acts of
same-sex intimacy do not fall within either the common law definition of sodomy, or
Vermont's more recent fellation statute. "Sodomy" is simply not synonymous with
same-sex intimacy, any more than it is with different-sex intimacy. See Amar, supra
note 58, at 231-32.
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this State's history, the very acts of sexual intimacy identified by the
State ("sodomy") have been proscribed for different sex couples, too.18
Nor does the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick"9 legitimate the State's discrimination. 2 Given that
Vermont does not criminalize consensual sexual conduct between
different-sex or same-sex couples, and given that this case presents a
Common Benefits Clause challenge rather than a federal due process
claim, Hardwick is irrelevant.
Moreover, the continued vitality of Hardwick is doubtful.
"Commentators have been virtually unanimous in their criticism of
Hardwick's reading of the Court's privacy jurisprudence." 21 Justice
Lewis Powell, who contributed the decisive fifth vote in that case, has
since conceded that, in retrospect, he "probably made a mistake," and
that "the dissent had the better of the arguments." '
The more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Romer v. Evans H at a minimum confines Hardwick to due process and
away from equal protection, and, more likely, overrules Hardwick al-
together.
124
118. To be sure, in addition to the common law prohibition of certain sex acts, Vermont's
statutes briefly contained the Levitican prohibition of some acts of male-male sexual
intimacy (but not lesbian sexual intimacy). See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 66.
However, by 1808 this prohibition no longer appeared in Vermont's statutes.
Moreover, by virtue of this Court's common law-based decision in LaForrest, Ver-
mont's actual prohibition of "illicit sexual conduct" was, from this State's inception,
broader and more inclusive than the narrower statutes cited by the State.
119. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
120. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 70.
121. Developments in the Law--Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HAv. L. R.v. 1508,
1523 n.30 (1989).
122. Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 26,
1990, atA3 (Appellants' Reply BriefAppendix Tab 13).
123. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
124. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(majority opinion "contradicts"
Hardwick). Doug Kmiec, a Pepperdine law professor and one of the signatories to the
State's Scholars Brief, has conceded, "If Bowers remained good law, then [Colorado]
would have a rational basis for the constitutional amendment that was at issue in
Romer.... [T]he majority has overruled Bowers sub silentio." Richard C. Reuben,
Gay Rights Watershed?, ABA J., July 1996, at 30 (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix
Tab 14).
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D. The State's Pursuit of "Uniform" Laws Undermines
Vermont's Autonomy
Whether denominated as an interest in "uniformity" or in pre-
serving marriage in a form recognized by all other states, 25 the State
essentially asks this Court to maintain its discrimination in marriage
because other states discriminate, too. Acquiescing in the prejudice of
other states by denying Vermont citizens the protections of their own
Constitution would render Vermont an accomplice to the prejudice of
others and eviscerate the independent significance of the Vermont
Constitution. 126 Nor has an interest in conformity been sufficient to
convince Vermont to forbid interracial marriages at times when most
other states did so, or to forbid first cousin marriages in present times,
or to disallow second parent adoption.
127
The State's push for uniformity ignores the valuable and historic
role state courts have played in developing independent family policies
and constitutional protections.128 Indeed, the amici states who have
filed an amicus brief in this case assert their respective rights to define
their own policies concerning marriage, but would deny Vermont the
same opportunity.
121
Nor does the principle of comity or cooperative federalism sup-
port the State's claim. 3 ' Although states sometimes apply another
125. See State's Motion to Dismiss at 57; PC, supra note 4, at 63.
126. See MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452 (1996)(Vermont Constitution
cannot indirectly or directly give effect to private biases).
127. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, PC, supra note 4, at 175-76.
128. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 773 (1982)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.")(quoting New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
129. See Brief Amicus Curiae of State of Nebraska et al. at 10-12 [hereinafter "Nebraska
Brief]. At least one state refused to join the Nebraska Brief because its Attorney
General believed that attempting to influence Vermont's interpretation of its mar-
riage laws would undermine that state's own independence in maintaining gender-
discrimination in marriage. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Graham Is Right Not To Join
Same-Sex Brief, DEsERET N-ws, May 21, 1998 (Appellants' Reply Brief Appendix
Tab 15)(defending refusal of Utah Attorney General to join Nebraska Brico. Inter-
estingly, nine of the eleven states who joined the Nebraska Brief could have made the
same argument to the California Supreme Court in 1948, when that court reviewed
California's ban on interracial marriages. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal.
1948).
130. See Nebraska Brief, supra note 129, at 4-7.
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jurisdiction's law when that law offends no policy of the forum state,
the State and its amici have not cited, and Appellants have been un-
able to locate, any case in which the courtesy of comity superseded a
State's application of its own constitutional guarantees, or in which
comity was invoked as a sword to prevent a speculative (perhaps illu-
sory) conflict rather than in the context of a specific dispute. "'
Finally,- every permutation of the interstate-recognition argument
rests on the feeble assumption that Vermont would long stand alone
in ending sex and sexual-orientation discrimination in marriage.11
2
IV. THIS COURT HAS A DUTY TO PROTECT APPELLANTS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this
Court that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." Unheeded then, those words are
now understood to state a commitment to the law's neutral-
ity where the rights of persons are at stake.
33
Beginning with these words, drawn from Justice Harlan's prescieni
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,'3 the United States Supreme Court added
its voice to the growing contemporary conversation about the role of
gay and lesbian citizens in our society, invalidating a popularly-
ratified Colorado constitutional amendment which placed legal pro-
tections against discrimination outside the reach of that state's gay and
lesbian citizens.
131. The notion that maintaining discrimination in marriage will conserve judicial re-
sources is another red herring. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 56. The interstate
marriage conflicts cases cited by the State all involved people who evaded Vermont's
marriage laws, not those who lawfully married under Vermont's laws, as Appellants
seek to do. Moreover, the Nebraska Brief fails to explain or support the inaccurate as-
sertion that ending discrimination against the marriages of same-sex couples in
Vermont would have some bearing on international recognition of different-sex mar-
riages performed in Vermont. See Nebraska Brief, supra note 129, at 15.
132. Recent court decisions in Alaska and Hawaii, along with international developments
in marriage, presage the inevitability of recognition of marriages between same-sex
partners throughout this country and the world. Even the federal Defense of Mar-
riage Act anticipates that some states will end discrimination in marriage. See 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1998).
133. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)(citations omitted).
134. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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The Romer opinion broke new ground in condemning reflexive
discrimination against the "otherness" of gay and lesbian Americans.
The words of the opinion are clear, and the symbolism is even
clearer:'" Times are changing, and a state may no longer deem gay
and lesbian citizens "stranger[s] to its laws."
136
Much has changed since the 1970s, when various state courts
considered the first round of marriage cases involving same gender
couples. This Court has led the nation in recognizing that family
forms are not rigid, and that our legal categories ought to respect and
protect evolving families-including those formed by same-sex part-
ners." 7 The freedom to marry the partner of one's choice has become
firmly established in the federal constitutional paradigm, 138 and the
right of gay and lesbian citizens to marry can no longer be abridged
through tautology, speculation, or fear-mongering. 13 State courts have
recognized the power of state constitutional guarantees against gender
requirements in marriage. 40 Civil marriage for same-sex couples exists
in all but name in several Scandinavian countries, and in this country,
135. Justice Brennan has described Justice Harlan's dissent as "the quintessential voice
crying out in the wilderness." William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37
HAStinGS L.J. 427, 431-32 (1986)("In his appeal to the future, Justice Harlan tran-
scended, without slighting, mechanical legal analysis; he sought to announce
fundamental constitutional truths as well. He spoke not only to his peers, but to his
society, and, more important, across time to later generations. He was, in this sense, a
secular prophet, and we continue, long after Pessy and long even after Brown v. Board
ofEducation, to benefit from his wisdom and courage.").
136. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
137. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993).
138. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
139. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61-63 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme Court
in Baehr distinguished Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) and De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) on
the ground that no state constitutional questions were raised. The same, of course, is
true of Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), and Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995). The Baehr majority also condemned the
tautological reasoning of Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)
and Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974). The other marriage cases
cited by the State or its amici have no relevance to this Court, see Stotrs v. Holcomb,
666 N.Y.S. 2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)(dismissing case solely on procedural
ground that plaintiffs had filed to join a necessary party), failed to provide any
meaningful analysis, or only discussed the marriage issue in dicta. See also Baehr v.
Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cit. Cr. Dec. 3, 1996)(Appellants' Appendix Tab
1).
140. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; see also Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-
6562 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998)(Appelant's Appendix Tab 2).
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some attributes of marriage have been accorded piecemeal to lesbian
and gay couples in areas ranging from employee benefits to adoption
rights. The right to marry is a pressing constitutional and public pol-
icy issue around the world, from right here in Vermont to South
Africa to New Zealand to the Netherlands. 4 '
As we stand at this crossroads, the State of Vermont asks this
Court to turn its back on the Appellants, to allow the State to deem
gay and lesbian individuals and same-sex couples strangers to Ver-
mont's laws and constitution. The State clothes its discrimination
with improper generalizations about the qualities and roles of men
and women; fearful but unfounded speculation about dire conse-
quences; inappropriate resort to unnamed higher authority; post hoc
requirements of marriage (i.e., procreation) that apply only to same-
sex couples; and reliance on tradition for its own sake. When these
layers are peeled away, all the State is left with is a naked and consti-
tutionally unsupportable favoritism for one part of the community
over another.
In an effort to shield its bald preference from constitutional scru-
tiny, the State advances the argument of last resort, imploring this
Court to abstain from vindicating Appellants' claims in deference to
the legislature."' The State offers two rationales in support of its plea.
First, the State argues that the legislature, and not the Court, is well-
suited to evaluate the "complex" ramifications of Appellants' request
for equal treatment in marriage. 4 Second, the State suggests that this
Court should defer to the legislature in the name of institutional le-
gitimacy. Neither assertion survives close analysis in light of this
Court's historical and constitutional responsibilities.
141. See Ej. Graff, The Inevitability of Same Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 1998
at A27 (Appellant's Appendix Tab 3, at 6).
142. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 88-93.
143. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 88-91. The Commonwealth of Virginia ultimately
resorted to the same "legislative deference" argument in urging the United States Su-
preme Court to uphold its racial classifications in marriage, arguing emphatically in
its brief in Loving v. Virginia that that Court had no authority to evaluate the wisdom
of Virginia's race restriction in marriage, and that the social theories and research sur-
rounding interracial marriage were too complex and controversial for judicial, rather
than legislative review. See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee [Virginia] at
38-50 (Reply Brief Appendix Tab 5). Cf State's Brief, supra note 3, at 93 ("Despite
what the Court may think about the sagacity of the Legislature's policy choice, that
decision must be respected."); State's Brief, supra note 3, at 89 ("Public testimony
before legislative committees is the proper avenue for the social scientists to present
their materials . . ").
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A. The State Confounds Policy Choices and Constitutional Imperatives
The State treats Appellants' claim to equal treatment under Ver-
mont's marriage laws as a complex "social policy" issue, requiring
legislative factfinding, debate, and decisionmaking. However, the pol-
icy debate was resolved long ago when the State of Vermont created
the institution of civil marriage and adopted various protections and
obligations to accompany that status. That "policy" debate reemerges
when the legislature modifies a privilege or responsibility of marriage,
and is implicit in the legislature's continuing preservation of a civil
marriage scheme.
The constitutional issue, on the other hand, is whether the legis-
lature has complied with the limitations of the Vermont Constitution
in enacting its marriage laws. While this Court may have a limited
role in wrestling with complex questions about the wisdom of Ver-
mont's civil marriage scheme, this Court is certainly competent to
interpret and enforce the Vermont Constitution. In fact, there is no
body in the world more competent to do so.
The State attempts to remove this case from the scope of this
Court's ordinary purview by characterizing Appellants' claims as
"novel." However, the constitutional protections upon which Appel-
lants rely are nothing new. Appellants merely seek the same
constitutional protections taken for granted by their heterosexual
neighbors: The right to be free from government classifications and
broad and limiting generalizations on the basis of gender is not novel.
The right to marry and form a family with the partner of one's choice
enjoys a distinguished constitutional pedigree. The right to freedom
from State discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is fully
consistent with the anti-favoritism ideals undergirding the Common
Benefits Clause. The right to meaningful judicial scrutiny to vindicate
a constitutional right dates from this State's founding. Perhaps most
important, the right not to be deemed a stranger to the laws, and a
second-class citizen, is fundamental to our constitutional democ-
144
racy.
144. The State's reliance on Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997), is thus
inapposite. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 90. Not only did that case involve a fed-
eral due process challenge, rather than a Vermont Common Benefits Clause claim,
but in that case the "right" which proponents sought to advance was, in fact, a new
right in the constitutional scheme.
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In arguing that this is an issue best left to the legislature, then, the
State is essentially arguing that the discriminatory marriage laws do not
violate Appellants' constitutional rights. (Otherwise, it would be inap-
propriate for the Court not to vindicate those rights.) Whether
Vermont's marriage laws, as interpreted by the State, violate the Ver-
mont Constitution is precisely the issue in this case. The "defer to the
legislature" argument is not in fact an argument at all-it is a conclusion.
B. The "Deference" the State Advocates Amounts to Abdication
In suggesting that this Court should "systematically underen-
force" constitutional rights,145 and ensure that its decisions in difficult
cases will meet with "public acceptability," 46 the State seems to be
urging this Court to neglect its constitutional responsibility. This
Court has long recognized its obligation to protect and uphold the
Vermont Constitution and the individual rights embodied therein
against electoral majorities.17 Indeed, over a century and a half ago the
Vermont Council of Censors recognized the importance of strong and
independent judicial review:
It is an attribute of the supreme judicial tribunals to judge of
the constitutionality of all laws passed by the legislature, when
properly brought in review before them. They are always to
145. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 91.
146. State's Brief, supra note 3, at 92.
147. See Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 223 (1995)("As the expression of the will of the
people, a constitution stands above legislative or judge-made law.... .'The very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.")(quoting Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 U.S. 368, 378 (1803)); Choquette v. Perrault, 153 Vt. 45, 51 (1989)(The
legislative power "is subject to judicial review to test the reasonableness and appropri-
ateness of the legislation to accomplish the result intended without oppression or
discrimination"); Westover v. Village of Barton Elec. Dep't, 149 Vt. 356, 359
(1988)("Mhe power to decide constitutional issues is vested in the courts."); State v.
Shop and Save Food Markets, Inc., 138 Vt. 332, 334-35 (1980)(noting Court's ob-
ligation to "look carefully to determine that no basic constitutional concern has been
transgressed and that no constitutional limitation on sovereignty has been over-
stepped"); Beecham v. Leahy, 130 Vt. 164, 172 (1972)("It is the function of the
judicial branch to pass upon the appropriateness and reasonableness of the legislative
exercise of the police power."); Granai v. Witters et al., 123 Vt. 468, 470 (1963)("It
is the function of the courts to maintain constitutional government."); State v. Quat-
tropani, 99 Vt. 360, 363 (1926)("[The validity of any mandate promulgated under
[the legislature's police power] is for judicial determination.").
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regard the constitution as the fundamental law of the land,
and superior to any legislative enactment. Consequently, if
the law is not warranted by, or is repugnant to, the provi-
sions of the constitution, as is sometimes the case, the judges
are bound to pronounce it inoperative and void. 148
Indeed, the Vermont Constitution itself recognizes that citizens have a
right to legal recourse to redress legal injuries or wrongs."'
In discharging its duty, the State essentially argues that this Court
should follow rather than lead electoral majorities in enforcing consti-
tutional rights. 50 History undermines the State's suggestion. Some of
the proudest moments for the judiciary have been those in which
courts rejected the State's approach, striking down unconstitutionally
discriminatory laws without regard to the popularity of their deci-
sions. For example, in 1948, at a time when thirty states prohibited
interracial marriage-six by constitutional provision-and social dis-
approbation of interracial marriages was rampant, the California
Supreme Court emphatically rejected the suggestion that majority
sentiment was enough to sustain race restrictions in marriage that de-
prived some, California citizens of the opportunity to marry their
chosen life partners.' Similarly, nine years later, the United States
Supreme Court rejected longstanding, widely-embraced, and vehe-
mendy-defended state laws requiring racial segregation in public
schools.12 History has vindicated these courts and their courage.
148. REcoRDs OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 431 (Paul S.
Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford, eds. 1991).
149. VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 4.
150. In so arguing, the State betrays the very scholars upon whom it relies. In describing
the strategic benefits of legislated civil rights advances, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Professor Stoddard never suggested for a moment that a court should refrain
from vindicating a constitutional right out of deference to a legislature; in fact, he ac-
knowledged that the national public conversation which gave rise to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 resulted in large part from the United States Supreme Court's counter-
majoritarian constitutional decision in Brown v. Board of Education. See Thomas B.
Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 967, 976, 977 n.21, 984 (1997). By the same token, in urging the
United States Supreme Court to refrain from granting certiorari in a marriage case at
the present time, Professor Sunstein acknowledged the value of state court decisions
addressing the marriage issue: "An advantage of a federal system is that it allows suc-
cessful experiments in constitutional law at the state level." Cass R. Sunstein,
Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1, 25 n.85 (1994).
151. SeePerezv. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
152. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19991
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
By way of contrast, where courts have surrendered their responsi-
bilities, or bowed to political pressure, civil rights and the credibility
of the courts themselves have ultimately suffered. For example, yield-
ing to the war-time anti-Japanese hysteria that gripped this nation
during World War II, the United States Supreme Court turned its
back on Japanese-American citizens, and their constitutional rights.'
Indeed, the act of deferring to the legislature in the face of bona
fide constitutional claims is a deeply political, non-judicial act:
If the judiciary bows to expediency and puts questions in the
"political" rather than in the justiciable category merely be-
cause they are troublesome or embarrassing or pregnant with
great emotion, the judiciary has become a political instru-
ment itself. Courts sit to determine questions on stormy as
well as on calm days. The Constitution is the measure of
their duty.'5
The Ontario Court of Appeal recently championed the same view
in rejecting that province's argument that the elected branches of gov-
ernment had the institutional right to address issues of gay and lesbian
equality incrementally. 55 Drawing on prior Canadian Supreme Court
caselaw, and noting the heavy burden on individual civil rights atten-
dant to the deferential approach advocated by the government, the
court in Rosenberg wrote:
[G]roups that have historically been the target of discrimi-
nation cannot be expected to wait patiently for the
protection of their human dignity and equal rights while
governments move toward reform one step at a time. If the
infringement of the rights and freedoms of these groups is
permitted to persist while governments fail to pursue equal-
153. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)(upholding forcible confine-
ment of Japanese-American citizens in internment camps); see also Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
154. JusTIcE WLmAm 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT Yx.its 55-56 (1980)(Appellants' Reply
Brief Appendix Tab 16).
155. See Rosenberg v. Canada, [1998] 158 D.L.R. (4th) 664 (Appellants' Reply Brief
Appendix Tab 17)(striking down as violative of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms a Canadian law providing tax benefits only to private pension plans that re-
strict survivor benefits to spouses of the opposite sex, thereby excluding same-sex
partners).
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ity diligently, then the guarantees of the Charter will be re-
duced to little more than empty words.
At what point, after all, can a court conclude that an ine-
quality is sufficiently mature to undergo the metamorphosis
from a permissibly delayed expectation to a constitutionally
ripe entitlement. Courts do not operate by poll. They are re-
quired to make a principled decision about whether a
constitutional violation is demonstrably justifiable in a free
and democratic society, not whether there might be a more
propitious time to remedy it.
Governments necessarily prefer to rely on perceived ma-
joritarian wishes; courts, particulary [sic] in the enforcement
of minority rights, are necessarily frequently obliged to over-
ride them. Waiting for attitudes to change can be a glacial
process, as the sixty years in the United States between Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) demonstrated.
The intervening years between the denial and the fulfilment
of the constitutional rights involved, permitted the gratui-
tous accumulation of a myriad of social injustices.
The government's reliance in this case on incrementalism
cannot succeed. While elected governments may wait for
changing attitudes in order to preserve public confidence
and credibility, both public confidence and institutional
credibility argue in favour of courts being free to make inde-
pendent judgments n-otwithstanding those same attitudes. 156
Appellants appeal to this Court to resist the State's invitation to
sidestep its constitutional duties, and urge this Court to maintain its
longstanding, principled position as a co-equal branch of government
and guardian of constitutional liberties. This Court's thoughtful deci-
sions in MacCallum and Brigham,"17 among other cases, demonstrate
that Justice Underwood's passionate defense of this Court's responsi-
bilities in shaping the common law applies with equal force to its role
156. Rosenberg, [1998] 158 D.L.R. (4th) at 675-76 (internal quotations omitted).
157. See MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452 (1996); Brigham v. State, 166 Vt.
246 (1997).
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in cultivating a Vermont constitutional jurisprudence to protect "not
only this generation of Vermonters but those who will come after us
in the decades yet to be:'"
The argument that... the issue is more appropriate for leg-
islative resolution is wholly unpersuasive; such an argument
ignores our responsibility to face a difficult legal question
and accept judicial responsibility for a needed change in the
common law...: [T'his Court has frequently met new and
difficult problems head-on, using common law principles.
Many of these cases have produced change which would
have a profound effect on social and business relationships,
such as industry-wide insurance patterns, husband-wife rela-
tionships, and lessor-lessee obligations, to mention only the
most obvious. When confronted with these difficult and
complex issues, this Court did not shirk its duty and retreat
into the safe haven of deference to the legislature. 5 '
158. State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 229 (1985).
159. Hayv. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, 145 Vt. 533, 543-44 (1985).
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